

# *Workshop Program*

## *Perspectives on Language, Reality, Society and Knowledge*

### **Friday (Feb 23)**

(Room 401, Sveučilišna avenija 4)

***Coffee 9:00-9:15***

***Welcome 9:15-9:30***

9:30-10:15 **EECF Career Planning: Delia Belleri** (University of Vienna): *Planning a Career in Philosophy: The Frequently Asked Questions*

10:15-11:00 **Matija Lukač** (University of Rijeka): *Thinking About Collective Intentionality as a Mechanism*

***Coffee 11:00-11:15***

11:15-12:00 **James Miller** (Trinity College Dublin): *Natural Name Theory, and Linguistic Kinds*

12:00-12:45 **David Grčki** (University of Rijeka): *Sequential Choice*

***Lunch 12:45-13:45***

13:45-14:30 **Eve Kitsik** (University of Tartu): *How Can Revisionary Ontology Improve Our Beliefs?*

14:30-15:15 **Martina Blečić** (University of Rijeka): *Conversational Implicatures as Arguments*

***Coffee 15:15-15:30***

15:30-17:00 **EECF Plenary Meeting**

**Saturday (Feb 24)**

(Room 401, Sveučilišna avenija 4)

***Coffee 9:00-9:15***

9:15-10:45 **EECP Plenary Lecture:** Prof. **Snježana Purić-Samaržija** (Rector of the University of Rijeka): *Real-world Philosophy*

***Coffee 10:45-11:00***

11:00-11:45 **Tomislav Miletić** (University of Rijeka): *Human-AmI Symbiosis:  
Enhanced Moral Agency*

11:45-12:30 **Dan Zeman** (University of Vienna): *Subject-Contextualism and the  
Meaning of Gender Terms*

***Lunch 12:30-13:30***

13:30-14:15 **Leonard Pektor** (University of Rijeka): *Values and Upbringing:  
A Liberal Outlook*

14:15-15:00 **Martin Vacek** (University of Bratislava): *On the Broadness of  
Metaphysical Ideology*

***Coffee 15:00-15:15***

15:15-16:45 **EECP Round Table:** **Ivan Cerovac** (University of Rijeka)

**Igor Eterović** (University of Rijeka)

**Toomas Lott** (University of Tartu)

**James Miller** (Trinity College Dublin)

***Workshop dinner 19:00***

# *Book of Abstracts*

## Early Career Planning Events

### *EECP Career Planning*

**Delia Belleri** (University of Vienna)

#### *Planning a Career in Philosophy: The Frequently Asked Questions*

The purpose of this session is that of opening a discussion about a number of common (but perhaps not sufficiently attended) questions about career planning. What steps must be taken when planning a post-doctoral application? Which are the main elements of an academic job application? What is the best publication-related policy? What are the main sources of funding for today's recent PhD graduates?

### *EECP Plenary Lecture*

**Prof. Snježana Prijić-Samaržija** (Rector of the University of Rijeka)

#### *Real-world Philosophy*

Emma Goldman once stated that the most violent element in society is ignorance. Indeed, behaviours such as reliance on stereotypes and prejudices, evident disregard for rational discourse and for responsible decision-making on individual, collective or institutional levels, a lack of awareness about the difference between populism and pluralism, as well as disregard for the importance of genuinely free, participatory, tolerant and epistemically relevant dialogue are often the most violent element of society. What is the role of philosopher in such real world circumstances? Is there a real-world philosophy? My career is a continuous pursuit of answers to these questions.

## Workshop Talks

**Martina Blečić** (University of Rijeka)

### *Conversational Implicatures as Arguments*

I suggest that the idea that conversational implicatures express argument can be significant for the notion of communicational responsibility. This underlying argument should be included in the reconstruction of conversational implicatures as a justification for the belief formed by the hearer on the basis of indirect communication. What makes this argument specific is the fact that its only explicit element is the speaker's utterance taken as its initial premise. In order to reconstruct all the other elements the hearer has to take into consideration factors such as the context and general knowledge of the shared language and the world. As the reconstruction of conversational implicatures in general, the reconstruction of implicatures as arguments is only potential. It is suggested that we can consider conversational implicatures as reason-giving arguments in which the speaker (arguer) addresses a hearer who does not need to reply. In those cases, the speaker is not trying to convince the hearer to accept his position but is explicitly stating a reason in support of his intended message. I believe that this approach can strengthen the idea of the speaker's communicative responsibility for an implicated message in case he wants to distance himself from it.

**David Grčki** (University of Rijeka)

### *Sequential Choice*

One of the key problems in the philosophy of rationality is how we make decisions. We make decisions every day. From mundane decisions about what to drink on our lunch break to more important decisions which have further consequences on our lives. In order to analyse our decision making in the context of philosophy of rationality we certainly need two things (two conditions): normative assessment and explanation and prediction of behaviour. Normative dimension of rationality is prescriptive i.e. tells us what people should do while descriptive dimension of rationality deals with what people are actually doing. In other words, it tries to explain and predict human behaviour.

Here, I am interested in a specific case of decision making problem: sequential (dynamic) choice. Sequential choice is a type of decision problem in which one's choice/choices are spread over time. People engage in sequences of choices that are not always reducible to a series of independent, individual choices. They make choices about how they will choose, and they make choices in the light of earlier commitments to choose in certain ways. They make plans for the future and they have a degree of concern for the plans that they have made in the past. This is the notion of sequential choice.

For a normative dimension of rationality I am taking abstract axiomatic model of decision making (von Neumann and Morgenstern) and for descriptive dimension of rationality I am taking two commonsensical examples to illustrate real decision making in practice.

In the end I am trying to find a reasonable middle ground between normative and descriptive in order to solve the problem of sequential choice.

**Eve Kitsik** (University of Tartu)

*How Can Revisionary Ontology Improve our Beliefs?*

My aim is to defend an account of the nature and epistemic significance of revisionary ontology. Revisionary ontologists are those who appear to be arguing that certain "ordinary" objects (such as tables and chairs) don't exist or that certain "extraordinary objects" (such as the sum of my nose and the Eiffel tower) exist. But what are revisionary ontologists really doing and how could their project improve our beliefs? I will argue, using Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many" (1980) as an example, that: (1) revisionary ontologists alert us to problems with ordinary concepts; and (2) this project could improve what I will call our "theoretical" beliefs, but not our "practical" beliefs.

**Matija Lukač** (University of Rijeka)

*Thinking About Collective Intentionality as a Mechanism*

This paper explores whether collective intentionality can be characterized on either of the two dominant conceptions of mechanism, due to Glennan and the team Machamer, Darden and Craver concept. Furthermore, this paper does not seek to provide an answer to the debate about the nature of collective intentionality, but tries to underline what philosophers can learn from it. Reading and interpretation provided in this paper is not quite similar to



Cohen's interpretation and understanding of intentionality. Namely, while Cohen thinks that collective intentionality is completely reducible to individual intentionality, this paper is more of an - epistemological study about the correctness of defining collective intentionality as a mechanism. The first part of the paper tries to explore and define the role of the debate on collective intentionality. It takes into account the epistemological position and the socio-ontological position of defining collective intentionality, its exploration, the methods of research, and - argues that both analyses face a similar problem (non-reducibility of collective intentionality to individual intentionality). The second part of the paper gives an analysis and discussion of the role and the value of this debate, with an emphasis on what we can actually - learn from it. More precisely, it tries to investigate whether collective intentionality has the potential of a mechanism, i.e. can it be adequately described within the framework of the new mechanistic philosophy.

**Tomislav Miletić** (University of Rijeka)

*Human-AmI Symbiosis: Enhanced Moral Agency*

Ambient Intelligence (AmI) is recognized by the European Union's Information Society Technologies Advisory Group as the framework inside which the future information society of intelligent software and robotic agents will empower human users in their daily lives. Artificial agents, seen as Intelligent Agents (IA), are expected to build novel hybrid epistemic-moral systems with the human users. In outlining the different epistemic possibilities of such systems, such as

multi-agent systems (MAS) or systems of collective agency, we aim to show that such novel epistemic systems are possible and can be formed, engineered and evaluated through a “bottom-up” system view approach. Additionally, to effectively form a moral and not just an epistemic system, the IA isn’t required to be a fully autonomous moral agent (AMA) but rather an explicit moral agent (EMA) functionally tailored for one such system at hand. Within such a system through the formation of a symbiotic relation of mutual interdependence, the human and the artificial agent effectively support, empower and enhance their moral-epistemic agency. Consequently, in exploring this possibility we support the research on the human moral agency as an essentially distributed enterprise open to enhancement and argue for a relational, mediated and systemic view of moral agency.

**James Miller** (Trinity College Dublin)

*Natural Name Theory, and Linguistic Kinds*

In a recent paper, Johnson has argued, I believe forcefully, that we should reconsider the natural name theory. This is proposed as an explanation of what is happening in cases of pure quotation. That is, it is proposed as a way to explain cases where a term seems to refer to itself within a sentence such as ‘In the above, ‘bank’ is ambiguous’. After some preliminaries, I argue that whilst the natural name theory is preferable to its competitors, Johnson’s version is restricted due to a reliance on the notion of ‘resemblance’ between a name and the linguistic entity it names to explain its naturalness. I suggest

that this might indicate a commitment to a nominalistic ontology of language, and argue that the natural naming theory can overcome these problems when instead combined with the adoption of realism about linguistic kinds.

**Leonard Pektor** (University of Rijeka)

*Values and Upbringing: A Liberal Outlook*

An American philosopher John Rawls is famous for his work in political philosophy, where he worked tirelessly, among other things, on finding universal principles of justice on which he could build a fair liberal society, one that would not only guarantee equal starting positions to its citizens, but also that they could all be treated as free and equal for generations to come. His monumental effort, was, of course, not without problems, but has nonetheless achieved universal impact, and found a revival of sorts in recent years, with his work being extended so as to apply to other fields of philosophy, like, perhaps most notably, in bioethics.

As we are (domestically) nowadays faced with increasing debates on how to best change our educational practices, so as to truly become the so-called knowledge society, the international community at large is still largely divided on the issue of how to respond to the consequences of the great immigration crisis, and how to treat the great influx of people that came to Europe as a result. I see these issues as being interconnected, where the educational policies adopted could greatly influence our perceptions and

responses to all the future crises of similar extent and importance, which are, unfortunately, highly likely to occur.

To that end, I looked into the possibilities of further extending Rawls' work, this time to the field of philosophy of education, and found that there are great opportunities of linking such an attempt to these current issues. In this paper, I therefore try to show how Rawlsian liberalism could be properly connected with contemporary practices in education and upbringing.

I will give an overview of the current discord prevailing in the field of philosophy of education, highlighting the need for a synthesis of sorts, thus setting the stage for Rawls as a possible solution. In the main part of the presentation, I will offer a brief overview of the main precepts of Rawls' Theory of Justice, which will serve as a basis for the main argument. In this argument, which I borrow from the work of Matthew Clayton, who did a great job at extending Rawls' work to education, it will be shown how and why liberal political principles could also be used to guide parental conduct, as well as educational methods. Lastly, I will turn to probable consequences of such a move, which I see in adopting a cosmopolitan view.

**Martin Vacek** (University of Bratislava)

### *On the Broadness of Metaphysical Ideology*

Ontology is 'the inquiry into what exists' according to a theory and ideology represents the representational power of the theory. In a broad sense, ideology includes all the concepts expressible within the theory, while narrow view on ideology concerns primitive, further unanalysed concepts only. A preference

for understanding ideology in the narrow sense comes from a greater interest in the primitive ideology. An analogous way of reasoning appears on the ontology site. For, there is at least two structurally distinct conceptions of the target of metaphysical inquiry: flat ontology and ordered ontology. In the former, there is no structure present in the subject of ontology, because the target is the set, or class, or plurality of entities. On the other side, order ontology postulates both fundamental entities and grounding relations, which generate the hierarchy of being. In my talk, I propose a simple argument according to which the pair <flat ontology; broad ideology> should be preferred.

**Dan Zeman** (University of Vienna)

*Subject-Contextualism and the Meaning of Gender Terms*

One key desideratum within feminist philosophy of language is to strive to give meanings to gender terms (“woman”, “man” etc.) in accordance with moral and social/political goals (e.g., Haslanger’s (2000) “ameliorative project”). One such proposal is contextualism, understood as a cluster of views according to which the meaning of gender terms depends, in various ways, on the context (Saul (2006)). However, it has been observed that extant versions of contextualism fail to do justice to trans people and thus depart from the moral and social/political goals stated (Saul (2012)). Recently, Diaz-Leon (2016) has put forward a version of contextualism (“subject-contextualism”) that is supposed to overcome that difficulty. In this paper I discuss and critically assess Diaz-Leon’s proposal.

## Organizing Committee

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