

Third EECF Workshop

Bratislava, 13-15 May, 2019

Venue: Conference Room on the 5th Floor,
Slovak Academy of Sciences, Klemensova 19, Bratislava

Monday, May 13

13:30 -14:00 - Welcome

14:00 -14:50 - **Martin Vacek**
(Bratislava): «Dispensing with Parsimony»

14:55 -15:45 - **Michaela Košová**
(Prague): «My Friend's True Self: Children's Concept of Personal Identity»

Coffee Break

16:10 -17:00 - **Henrik Sova**
(Tartu): «Truth-value assessment relativism entails content-relativism»

17:05 -17:55 - **David Grcki**
(Rijeka): «Planing ahead: A runaway bride case»

18:00-18:50 - **Janko Nesic**
(Belgrade): «Subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory»

Tuesday, May 14

Workshop with Scott Soames

EECF Workshop resumes

16:40 -17:30 - **Jessica Bicking**
(Vienna): «Measuring Empathy - Between Concept and Application»

17:35-18:25 - **Sanja Sreckovic**
(Belgrade): «Contribution of neuropsychological research to the philosophical debates on musical meaning»

Wednesday, May 15

9:00 -10:30 - Round table: Career development

Informal session with coffee, moderated by **Delia Belleri** (Vienna). All welcome.

Coffee Break

10:45 -11:35 - **Brice Bantegnie**
(Prague): «A Farewell to the Autonomy of Psychology»

11:40 -12:30 - **Martina Blečić**
(Rijeka): «Lying and Deniability»

12:30 -13:15 - EECF Board Meeting

Book of Abstracts

Brice Bantegnie (Prague): “A Farewell to the Autonomy of Psychology”

Humans have the capacity to predict and explain each other's behavior. Whether or not they use some explicit knowledge to do so, they share some beliefs about psychology. These beliefs put together constitute a folk-psychology. Starting in the 80's and for roughly 15 years, a debate opposed those who thought that folk psychology was false and had therefore to be eliminated to those who disagreed on both counts. It seems that the latter could claim victory. With this paper, I aim to reopen the debate. My starting point is that one should distinguish (at least) two kinds of psychological regularities: first, those which can be used to explain actions, and second, those which can be used to explain the first ones. I go on to argue that folk psychological regularities are of the first kind and that, as a consequence, the question of whether they should be eliminated from our explanations of regularities of the first kind or not is void. I then argue that folk psychological regularities, as psychological regularities of the first kind, are false, and discuss the question of whether we should infer from this that they should be eliminated.

Jessica Bicking (Vienna): “Measuring Empathy: Between Concept and Application”

With social cognition currently placing high on the scientific agenda, the last few years have seen an upsurge in work on empathy across many fields. While the interest seems shared, there is still little agreement to be found on what precisely empathy is. In philosophy of mind, a return to early phenomenological work has brought forth direct social perception and interaction theory accounts of empathy that seem to challenge and obviate an established conceptual distinction between cognitive and affective empathy. While seemingly dissolving in the conceptual work, the cognitive-affective contrast is alive and kicking in the tools of measurement for empathy in the empirical research, but the multitude of

different, mixed, and conflicting scales seem to reflect the disagreements on the conceptual level. In my research I currently explore the conceptual tensions that are driving the development in the theoretical literature, as well as the question of how these insights might productively inform the operationalization of the concept for empirical research.

Martina Blečić (Rijeka): “Lying and Deniability”

According to the standard definition of lying to lie is to make a believed-false statement to another person with the intention that the other person believe that statement to be true. Recently, a variety of authors has presented the idea that the intention to deceive the addressee is not necessary for lying. Contrary to that stance, I will suggest that while we should keep the intention to deceive as a condition for lying we could reject the idea that we need to make a statement in order to lie. I will propose the inclusion of implicit verbal deception in the definition of lying. I will defend this maneuver using the notion of default meaning and claim that expressing something we disbelieve using implicit and indirect pragmatic means with the intention to deceive the addressee should be considered lying because it's the default meaning of our utterance. Contrary to popular belief, in such cases, the speaker will not always be able to deny his communicative intention. Finally, to make my proposal more vivid, I will present Shakespeare's Iago as a counterexample to the traditional definition of lying.

David Grčki (Rijeka): “Planning ahead: The runaway bride case”

The dynamic choice problem is a problem in the fields of philosophy of rationality and philosophy of action. The problem addresses the question: How do we make decisions over time and what should the rational constraints for such decisions be? We make decisions in this form constantly. From everyday decisions about what will we eat for lunch to more important decisions that have long term consequences for our lives. The dynamic choice problem originally arose from formal decision theory but was substantively addressed from other perspectives. In this paper, using my main example, the runaway bride case, I will assess different strategies proposed to solve the dynamic choice problem. Some of them are strong considered from the normative aspect of rationality, namely the sophisticated choice strategy and the resolute choice strategy, and some of them are strong from the descriptive aspect of rationality, namely Bratman's no regret account and Bratman's self-governance principle. I conclude by endorsing Bratman's self-governance principle as the solution for the dynamic choice problem because it has a better tradeoff between the normative and descriptive dimension of rationality than the opposing accounts.

Michaela Košová (Prague): “My Friend's True Self: Children's Concept of Personal Identity”

The paper briefly introduces experimental philosophy and addresses recent research on the concept of personal identity. By showing how different studies explore this problematic we reveal the importance of x-phi as an approach that brings a new understanding of traditional philosophical topics. By introducing our own research, we demonstrate the methods of x-phi in closer detail. Over 200 children and teenagers participated in an interview study based on a hypothetical scenario about a sudden change of their friend. Children were supposed to judge to what extent particular changes (from 6 categories of traits) would change true self of the person in question. Our data show that children considered moral traits (esp. positive traits connected to interpersonal relationships) crucial for personal identity preservation. Data is in accord with the “essential moral self” hypothesis that suggests that the folk concept of personal identity is socially determined. Our other online research on dualistic intuitions with almost 3000 adult participants points in the same direction. Now that we know that the folk concept of personal identity bears natural connection to interpersonal relationships and morality, we should ask to what extent this experimental finding should be reflected in philosophical theories.

Janko Nešić (Belgrade): “Does integrated information lack subjectivity?”

Abstract: I investigate the status of subjectivity in the Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if the Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness. On itself, the Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to the hard problem, but could be combined with a version of panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory of consciousness. I will show, that

even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical machinery of panpsychism, it would still suffer from a different problem, not being able to account for the subjective character of consciousness. Thus, I will argue that a proper understanding of mineness, self-awareness and subjectivity in general, creates a problem for the externalist model of the Integrated Information Theory.

Henrik Sova (Tartu): “Assessment-relativism entails content relativism”

I will argue that assessment-relativism entails content relativism. The central idea of the assessment-relativism is that the same token claim in a single world can take different truth-values when considered in different contexts of assessment. Content relativism is here understood as the doctrine according to which the propositional content of a given claim depends on the context of assessment. It is usually thought that assessment-relativism can be pursued in terms of truth-value relativism without content relativism – the same content gets different assessment in terms of truth value (e.g. MacFarlane 2014 Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications §4.2). I argue that commitment to assessment sensitivity does entail content relativism. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that assessment-relativism entails the assessment-sensitivity of the sentential truth predicate. Second, I argue that given the assessment sensitivity of the truth predicate, it is also an assessment sensitive matter which proposition a sentence expresses. Thus, the overall conclusion is that assessment-relativism entails content relativism in the sense that it is an assessment-contextual matter what proposition a given sentence expresses.

Sanja Sreckovic (Belgrade): “Contribution of neuropsychological research to the philosophical debates on musical meaning”

One of the crucial questions in philosophy and aesthetics of music concerns meaning in music. Several influential theoreticians of music believe that proper understanding of music focuses on the musical structure, since the structure itself is what the music means, i.e. the meaning is exhausted by the musical ideas (“tone-ideas”). On the other hand, many philosophers of music focus on the fact that music is able to express much more outside of its formal structure, and claim that meaning in music consists in those references, especially, that musical meaning is actually emotional meaning. The aim of the paper is to examine the contribution of experimental psychological research for the philosophical questions concerning musical meaning. After presenting results of several relevant neuropsychological studies, the presentation will proceed with an analysis of the ways to enrich the classical philosophical debate on the meaning in music. The implications of the paper will reveal higher complexity of the issue of musical meaning than is implicitly assumed in the theoretical debates. The second important implication is the suggestion of a way in which theoretical questions concerning music can be approached with the help of experimental psychology in future research.

Martin Vacek (Bratislava): “Dispensing with Parsimony”

Metaphysical parsimony is traditionally considered as a theoretical virtue. In my talk, I doubt the claim and argue that given we differentiate between qualitative and quantitative ontology and ideology, neither entities nor kinds of entities play an important role in theory choice and comparison. Since such result has some surprising consequences I respond to three objections against the view.